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Abstract How willingness to pay for environmental quality changes as incomes rise is
a central question in several areas of environmental economics. This paper explores both
theoretically and empiricallywhether or not thewillingness to pay (WTP) for pollution control
varies with income. Our model indicates that the income elasticity of the marginal WTP for
pollution reduction is only constant under very restrictive conditions. Our empirical analysis
tests the null hypothesis that the elasticity of the WTP for pollution control with respect to
income is constant, employing a multi-country contingent valuation study of eutrophication
reduction in the Baltic Sea. Our findings reject this hypothesis, and estimate an income
elasticity of the WTP for eutrophication control of 0.1–0.2 for low-income respondents and
0.6–0.7 for high-income respondents. Thus, our empirical results suggest that the elasticity
is not constant but is always less than one. This has implications for how benefits transfer
exercises, and for theoretical explanations of the environmental Kuznets curve.
Keywords Baltic Sea · Benefits transfer · Environmental Kuznets curve · Eutrophication ·
Income elasticity of willingness to pay · Non-market valuation
JEL Classification Q51 · Q53 · Q56
Introduction
Since the seminal study by Kriström and Riera (1996), economists have debated whether
and how the willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental improvement varies with respect to
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income, and what the likely magnitude of that income elasticity might be. There is evidence
from consumer expenditure surveys that environmental quality could be a luxury good,
implying that the income elasticity of demand is higher than one (Ghalwash 2008). In contrast,
studies that directly estimate the income elasticity of WTP for environmental improvement
find that this elasticity is typically less than one (Kriström and Riera 1996; Ready et al. 2002;
Hökby and Söderqvist 2003; Jacobsen and Hanley 2009; Czajkowski and Šcˇasný 2010).
Others have shown that the theoretical relationship between the elasticity of demand and
the income elasticity of WTP is not straightforward for environmental public goods, and
that knowledge of the one does not necessarily provide information on the other (Flores and
Carson 1997; Ebert 2003).
Whether the elasticity of theWTP for environmental improvement with respect to income
is constant is yet to be resolved. There is a growing theoretical literature suggesting that
this parameter is unlikely to be constant (Flores and Carson 1997; Ebert 2003; Hökby and
Söderqvist 2003). Similarly, some theoretical explanations of the environmental Kuznets
curve (EKC) are consistent with the marginal WTP for reducing pollution varying with
income (McConnell 1997; Stokey 1998; Andreoni and Levinson 2001; Israel and Levinson
2004). In contrast, recommended guidance principles for benefits transfer are often based
on the assumption that the income elasticity of these WTP values is constant (Pearce 2006;
Ready and Navrud 2006; Czajkowski and Šcˇasný 2010; Lindhjem and Navrud 2015).
The purpose of this paper is to explore both theoretically and empirically whether or not
the WTP for pollution control varies with income. A theoretical explanation is presented
of how the income elasticity of WTP for more of an environmental good—or less of an
environmental bad—varies with income. We then undertake an empirical investigation of
whether or not the income elasticity is constant, based on a large multi-country dataset of
individual WTP survey responses for environmental improvements in the Baltic Sea.
Following Andreoni and Levinson (2001), Israel and Levinson (2004), McConnell (1997)
and Stokey (1998), our theoreticalmodel demonstrates the conditions underwhich the elastic-
ity of the marginalWTP for reducing pollution with respect to income is likely to be constant.
However, in contrast to these earlier models in which environmental quality is controlled in
a social planner’s problem, the model developed here is based on a representative agent’s
decision whether or not to contribute some portion of their income to pollution reduction.
Since our derivation of the income elasticity is based on preferences, it enables a comparison
with theoretical explorations in the environmental valuation literature that distinguish the
income elasticity of WTP from the demand for environmental quality with respect to income
(Flores and Carson 1997; Ebert 2003; Hökby and Söderqvist 2003). Our model indicates that
the income elasticity of the marginalWTP for pollution reduction is only constant under very
restrictive conditions, and moreover, confirms that a constant elasticity is not necessary for
generating an environmental Kuznets curve relationship between pollution levels and income
per capita.
Although the main objective of our theoretical model is to show conceptually what might
influence the income elasticity of the marginal WTP for pollution reduction, and how this
elasticity might vary across people, actually determining whether this elasticity is constant
is primarily an empirical issue. Consequently, the aim of our empirical analysis is to test the
null hypothesis that the elasticity of the WTP for pollution control with respect to income is
constant. To do this, wemake use of a large multi-country dataset from a contingent valuation
study of the benefits of meeting nutrient reduction targets for the Baltic Sea (Ahtiainen et al.
2014). The survey was aimed at estimating theWTP for reducing eutrophication in the Baltic
Sea, with respondents drawn from9 littoral countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland,Germany,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden. Due to the large differences in respondents’
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income levels between and within these countries, the dataset provides a unique opportunity
to examine the income elasticity of WTP for reducing eutrophication across a very wide
range of household income levels—from less than 500 to over 5000euros (EUR) per month.
We employ the Box-Cox model to test our null hypothesis, which is rejected. We find that
the income elasticity of the WTP for eutrophication control is increasing and concave, and
that it behaves similarly irrespectively of model specification. It takes values of 0.1–0.2 for
low-income respondents and reaches 0.6–0.7 for the highest income levels observed in our
dataset. This result is consistent with previous findings (Ready et al. 2002; Czajkowski and
Šcˇasný 2010).
The outline of our paper is as follows. The next section develops our theoretical model
of the WTP for pollution reduction, which we use to derive the conditions under which the
income elasticity of this WTP is constant. Next, we discuss the implications of this model for
deriving an environmental Kuznets curve relationship between pollution levels and income
per capita and for non-marginal pollution reductions. The subsequent sections of the paper
develop our Box-Cox regression model for testing the null hypothesis that the elasticity of
the marginal WTP for pollution control with respect to income is constant, and apply this
model to our case study of eutrophication control in Baltic Sea countries. We conclude by
discussing our theoretical and empirical results, and their implications for future research.
Theoretical Model
Assume that there are N individuals in an economy, who may be willing to pay for a spe-
cific improvement in environmental quality, such as reducing the water pollution associated
with eutrophication of a nearby coastal area. Eutrophication is disliked because it accelerates
growth of algae in water bodies, diminishes enjoyment of seaside recreation and disrupts
aquatic ecosystems. The water pollution causing eutrophication consists of nutrient emis-
sions, which are directly linked to the total levels of production and consumption in the
economy. Assuming a feasible technology for abating these emissions, individuals may be
willing to forego some of their income that would otherwise be spent on consumption in
order to contribute to overall pollution abatement.
Thus the utility function of a representative agent in the economy is
U = U (c, P) , Uc > 0, Ucc < 0, UP < 0, UPP < 0, (1)
where c is per capita consumption and P is the overall water pollution level associated with
eutrophication. Let y denote the individual’s given level of per capita income. The choice is to
allocate a share. ω ∈ [0, ω]. of this income to pollution control, with the remainder spent on
consumption. However, there is a minimal level of consumption that ensures an upper limit
ω on the individual’s allocation of income to pollution abatement, i.e., c = (1 − ω) y = c.
If α (Nωy) is the reduction in pollution through all individuals’ expenditures on pollution
control, then overall emissions generated in the economy is
P = [cN − α (ωyN )] = (1 − ω) y − α (ωy) , N = 1, (2)
where normalizing the number of individualsmaintains the focus on the representative agent’s
decision (e.g., P can now be thought of as per capita pollution levels). The abatement tech-
nology is governed by
α′ (ωy) > 0, α (0) = 0, α′ (0) = 0, α (ωy) = α, α′ (ωy) = β < ∞. (3)
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For a given income level, pollution abatement is an increasing function of expenditure allo-
cated to pollution control. Abatement cannot occur if no money is allocated to reducing
pollution, abatement is finite if the maximum amount is allocated to control, and the rate of
increase in pollution abatement at the upper limit on control is bounded above by β.
The representative agent’s problem is
max
ω∈[0,ω]U ((1 − ω) y, (1 − ω) y − α (ωy)) . (4)
For the given level of income y, the optimal allocation share for reducing pollution ω∗
satisfies
−UC − UP
(
1 + α′) ≤ 0, ω ≥ 0
−UC − UP
(
1 + α′) ≥ 0, ω ≤ ω (5)
For the corner solution ω = 0, the marginal benefit of pollution abatement −UP
(
1 + α′) is
less than the cost UC y, and thus the individual will not contribute any income to emission
reduction. All of the agent’s income will be devoted to consumption, and thus pollution will
be at its maximum P = c = y. For the other corner solutionω = ω, the marginal benefit of
pollution abatement exceeds the marginal cost, and the individual will allocate the maximum
amount of income to pollution reduction. As this corner solution is not important for what
follows, for simplicity it will be assumed thatω > ω.
The marginal WTP for pollution reduction wp is therefore defined by the marginal rate
of substitution between less pollution and more consumption −UP/Uc and is governed by
the following condition
wp = −UP
Uc
≤ 1
1 + α′ , ω ≥ 0. (6)
In the case of the corner solution, the WTP is equal only to the marginal rate of substitution
between less pollution and consumption. In the case of the interior solution, the marginal
rate of substitution must also equal 1/1 + α′, the opportunity cost of less pollution in terms
of foregone consumption.
For the corner solution case,when the representative agent allocates no income to pollution
reduction, ω = 0. It follows from (2) and (6) that P = c = y and wP = −UP (y)/UC (y).
Consequently,
∂wP
∂y
= UccUP − UPPUc
[Uc]2
> 0, εP ≡ ∂wP
∂y
· y
wP
= UccUP − UPPUc−UcUP y > 0. (7)
The marginal WTP for pollution control increases with income, and the elasticity of wp
with respect to income is also positive. Because the terms in the denominator of εP in (7) are
a function of per capita income, this elasticity is not constant.
For the interior optimum, changes in wP = −UP/Uc correspond to changes in the
opportunity cost of reduced pollution 1/1 + α′. By examining how changes in y affect the
right-hand side of (6), we can infer how marginal WTP for pollution reduction also responds
to changes in income. It follows that
∂wP
∂y
= −α
′′ω
[1 + α′]2 , εP ≡
∂wP
∂y
· y
wP
= −α
′′
1 + α′ ωy. (8)
As Eq. (8) indicates, how the marginal WTP for reduced pollution changes with income
depends on the curvature of the abatement technology function α (ωy) as governed by (3). If
this technology is increasing and convex, and thus α′′ > 0, then as income increaseswp falls.
However, if abatement technology is increasing and concave so that α′′ < 0, then wp rises
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as income increases. There is no change in wp if abatement increases linearly with pollution
reduction expenditure (α′′ = 0). Similarly, the income elasticity of the marginal WTP for
pollution reduction also varies with abatement technology, i.e., εP  0 if α′′  0. Unless
abatement technology is linear so that εP = 0, for different per capita income levels, the
income elasticity of WTP is not constant.
Finally, as (7) indicates, even if the individual allocates no income to pollution control, the
agent’s marginal WTP for pollution reduction rises with per capita income. If income arises
above some threshold level yˆ, the interior solution is reached. It follows that the conditions
for optimal abatement, pollution levels and marginal WTP for pollution reduction can be
restated as
α
(
ω∗y
) = 0, P = c = y, wP = −UP
Uc
, y ≤ yˆ (9)
α
(
ω∗y
)
> 0, P = (1 − ω∗) y − α (ω∗y) , wP = 1
1 + α′ (ω∗y) , y > yˆ . (10)
As per capita income rises to yˆ, pollution increases by the same amount. It must reach
its maximum at yˆ, because for income beyond this threshold, emissions declines at the rate
∂P/∂y = −ω∗ (1 + α′) < 0.
Discussion
Figure 1 summarizes the key results. The upper diagram shows the change in the marginal
WTP for pollution reduction as per capita income increases, and the bottom diagram indicates
the resulting pollution–income relationship. Because the top figure is drawn in c − P space,
the marginal rate of substitution relationship in (6) is transformed toUc/−UP ≥ 1 + α′. The
corresponding indifference curves are depicted as solid lines, and the increasing and convex
production possibility frontiers for different pollution–consumption combinations are the
dotted lines. Although the latter frontiers are drawn through the origin, for a given level of
income, there is always a minimal level of pollution given by P = c − α (ωy).
Assume that the initial level of per capita income y0 iswell below the threshold level yˆ. This
corresponds to a corner solution at point A, where the marginal WTP for pollution reduction
is defined by the marginal rate of substitution between less pollution and consumption (see
condition (6) above). As income increases, wP rises although pollution continues to increase
as P = c = y. At point B, income attains the threshold level, and although still a corner
solution, pollution reaches its peak Pˆ . If income increases above the threshold level, the
marginalWTP for pollution reduction and its elasticity with respect to income depends on the
opportunity cost of pollution reduction, which in turn is dictated by the abatement technology.
Point C represents one such interior optimum. Figure 1 indicates the casewhere the abatement
technology is increasing but concave with respect to pollution control expenditures, i.e.,
α′′ (ωy) < 0. The income elasticity of the marginal WTP for pollution reduction is positive,
but as income increases, pollution declines more slowly with income (i.e., the slope of the
pollution–income relationship beyond yˆ becomes flatter).
These results confirm, as Flores and Carson (1997) and Ebert (2003) have shown, that
the demand for environmental quality with respect to income does not indicate the actual
income elasticity for the WTP for pollution reduction. Similarly, a constant elasticity is
not necessary for an environmental Kuznets curve relationship between pollution levels and
income per capita (McConnell 1997; Israel and Levinson 2004). Although in the corner
solution there is no demand for reduced pollution and emissions increase exactly with income
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and consumption, P = c = y, the WTP income elasticity is positive and increasing with
income. Above the threshold yˆ, pollution always declines with increased income, but the
income elasticity εP could be increasing, decreasing or constant.
Although the derived pollution–income relationship in this model is similar to that in
Stokey (1998), the conditions leading to this relationship differ. Stokey (1998) assumes that
pollution increaseswith income at lowper capita income levels in an economybecause it is too
poor tomodify the “dirtiest” emissions technology.Here, the keydeterminant iswhether or not
the average individual is willing to allocate some income to pollution reduction expenditures.
Our theoretical result is thus based on preferences. If the representative agent is not willing
to spend any income on control, then pollution increases with income. Once some income is
allocated to reduce emissions, the abatement technology influences not only how pollution
declines with income but also the sign and magnitude of the income elasticity of the WTP
for pollution control. This role of abatement technology in affecting any pollution–income
relationship is consistent with Andreoni and Levinson (2001), who show that the returns to
scale in pollution control is key to an environmental-Kuznets curve for pollution.
Note also that, if the elasticity of the WTP for a marginal reduction in pollution with
respect to income is not constant, then the income elasticity of the WTP for a non-marginal
pollution reduction is also unlikely to be constant. For example, the WTP by an individual
for a non-marginal reduction in water pollution from P0 to P1 is by definition
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W (P) = −
∫ P1
P0
wp (y) dp, P1 < P0, (11)
which is the area under the marginal WTP curve bounded by the pollution levels P0 to P1. It
follows that the effects of a change in income on the WTP for a non-marginal reduction in
pollution is ∂W (P)
∂y = −
∫ P1
P0
∂wp
∂y dp and the corresponding income elasticity is
εW = ∂W (P)
∂y
· y
W (P)
= y
∫ P1
P0
∂wp
∂y dp
∫ P1
P0
wp (y) dp
. (12)
Unless ∂wP/∂y = 0, the income elasticity of the WTP for a non-marginal pollution
reduction,εW , is not constant. As already shown above, ∂wP/∂y > 0 for the corner solu-
tion and is only equal to zero under for the interior optimum if the abatement technology is
linear (i.e., α′′ = 0).
To summarize, the results derived from our theoretical model indicate that the elasticity
of the marginal WTP of individuals for pollution reduction is only constant under some
very restrictive conditions. Nor is a constant elasticity necessary to derive an environmental
Kuznets relationship between pollution and income. Determining how this elasticity varies
with income, and its magnitude at different income levels, is therefore an empirical issue that
requires further investigation.
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical analysis explores the relationship between consumers’ WTP for improving
environmental quality (i.e., reducing pollution) and income. We investigate this relationship
econometrically using the Box-Cox model extended for use with multi-variate data (Box and
Cox 1964; Andrews et al. 1971). In particular, we adopt the following functional form of
the Box-Cox model, which has become an accepted standard in econometric studies in cases
where specification of the functional relationship between some variables of interest cannot
be based on a priori economic rationale (Sakia 1992):
y(λ0)i = β0 +
K∑
k=1
x (λk )ki βk + εi . (13)
Note that, in the above specification, the dependent and each of the explanatory variables
can be transformed with a different parameter. These transformations incorporate a wide
range of functional forms, nesting linear (λ = 1), logarithmic (λ = 0), unit root and many
others, and as such allow for a great flexibility. As a result, estimations based on (13) have
been extensively used for uncovering a wide range of non-linear relationships in economics.1
In what follows we apply this approach for modelling the income elasticity of the WTP
for controlling pollution. There are two main reasons for this—firstly, it incorporates a wide
range of functional forms which allows us to investigate the a priori unknown form of non-
linearity of the relationship (and correct for the natural skewedness in the data). Secondly,
1 For example, recent empirical applications include the functional form of cost functions (Berbeka et al.
2012), modelling price changes (Milon et al. 1984; Mishili et al. 2011; Karaman and Yavuz 2014), portfolio
choice (Garlappi and Skoulakis 2011), the economic effects of invasive species (Horsch and Lewis 2009),
elasticities of demand and supply (Bessler et al. 1984; Czajkowski and Šcˇasný 2010), and various health
economics applications Manning (2013).
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since it includes logarithmic transformation as a special case, it provides a convenient way
to test the restriction that the transformation parameters of WTP (dependent variable) for
pollution control and income (one of the explanatory variables) are both equal to zero, which
is equivalent of the log–log relationship and results in the income elasticity of WTP being
constant.2
To take into account the possibility that the maximum likelihood estimation of the Box-
Cox transformed regression model may not be robust to heteroskedascity (Zarembka 1974),
we allow for multiplicative variance heterogeneity of the following form
εi ∼ f
(
0, σ 2 exp (ziγ)2
)
, (14)
where z is a vector of explanatory variables of variance and γ—a vector of the associ-
ated parameters estimated simultaneously with linear and transformation parameters of the
model.3
Case Study
We empirically explore the relationship betweenWTP for pollution control and income using
a large dataset from a contingent valuation study of the benefits of meeting nutrient reduction
targets for the Baltic Sea. The surveywas aimed at estimating respondents’WTP for reducing
eutrophication (one of the most prominent threats to the Baltic Sea) and its environmental
effects onwater clarity, blue–green algal blooms, sea grass beds, and fish species composition
(Ahtiainen et al. 2014).
The study was conducted in 9 littoral countries of the Baltic Sea: Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden, with the adult population
in these countries totaling over 230million people. Due to the large differences in the income
levels between and within these countries, the dataset provides an opportunity to examine
income elasticity of WTP for reducing eutrophication across a very wide range of income
levels—from less than 500 to over 5000EUR per month.
The study used a payment card as a WTP elicitation format (Rowe et al. 1996). The bid
vectors used in these cards were country specific, based on the distribution of WTP observed
in pilot studies. However, the payment cards were otherwise constructed using the same bid
design methodology (Roach et al. 2002). In what follows, we use the mid-point of each
respondent’s selected interval as an estimate of his or her individual maximum WTP.
The contingent scenario and the survey were designed following state-of-the-art standards
for contingent valuation studies (Bateman et al. 2004; Champ et al. 2004; Carson and Hane-
mann 2005; Dillman et al. 2014). Identical questionnaires, translated into national languages,
were used to collect the data. See Ahtiainen et al. (2014)) for the details regarding the study,
the results and their policy relevance.
The surveywas designed in 2010–2011 and implemented inOctober–December 2011. The
primary data collection method was Computer Assisted Web Interviews (CAWI), Computer
Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI) were, however, used in the countries where the internet
coverage was low, thus not warranting representativeness of a web-based sample (Latvia,
Lithuania and Russia; Poland implemented both methods simultaneously). Both CAPI and
2 To test this hypothesis we use asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio, which have been shown to
have good power properties in this case (Doksum and Wong 1983).
3 The estimation package allowing for independent Box-Cox transformations of all model variables, multi-
plicative heteroskedascity and imposing restrictions was written in Matlab and is available from http://github.
com/czaj/BoxCox under Creative Commons BY 4.0 license.
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CAWI were conducted by professional survey companies. Samples were randomly drawn
and stratified to represent national population data on, gender, age and regional location.
In total, 10,564 surveys were collected across the nine countries of which 10,396 were
complete enough to be used in this analysis. Table 1 presents socio-demographic character-
istics of the survey sample versus general population in each country. The samples exhibited
reasonable properties in terms of representativeness, with possibly larger households, lower
net income and higher education levels compared to the official statistics.
Ahtiainen et al. (2014) use the same data to calculate the benefits ofmeeting nutrient reduc-
tion targets for the Baltic Sea. In addition, however, they also make an effort to investigate
the differences between country-specific income elasticity ofWTP. To this end, they estimate
a model imposing a constant income elasticity of WTP, and use the nine country-specific
estimates to infer the relationship between the estimated (constant) income elasticity ofWTP
and the income level in each country, finding no significant relationship. In what follows, we
provide a substantially extended analysis, by estimating a Box-Cox regression models which
allow for non-constant income elasticity of WTP. The relationship between income elasticity
of WTP and the income level is then investigated on an individual respondent level, rather
than on a country level.
Results
We apply the Box-Cox regression model (13) to the data collected in the empirical Baltic
Sea study described above. Since our primary interest is in estimating the relationship of
respondents’ WTP for eutrophication reduction and income levels, we estimated the model
employing the following specification
WT P(λ0)i = xiγ + income(λ1)i βincome + εi , (15)
where (λ0) and (λ1) refer to separate Box-Cox transformation parameters. In order to account
for likely differences between the countries’ average WTP levels we used a fixed-effect type
of treatment where the xi vector includes dummy variables for each of the countries. We
tested if our results are robust across several specifications, such as including additional
respondent specific controls in xi (sex, age, education level and household size), allowing
for heteroskedascity (the error term variance to be country-specific, as specified in (14)) or
both.
The results of these modelling approaches are presented in Table 2.4 Country-specific
fixed effects were a substantial and statistically significant improvement to our models, and
in addition, some of the country-specific constants were statistically different from each
other, indicating differences in mean WTP levels. Respondents’ net income was also a
highly significant explanatory variable of WTP for eutrophication reduction. Most of the
respondent-specific control variables were also significant: male respondents were willing to
pay consistently less than others, and respondents who were better educated and who lived in
higher-income households were willing to pay more. The explanatory variables of the error
term variance (not reported) were all highly significant and substantially improved the model
fit. These results are consistent across all model specifications.
The Box-Cox transformation parameters associated with the variables WTP and income
in (15) are both significantly different from zero. This is an indication that, at least in the
4 Both WTP and income levels were converted to EUR using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) corrected
exchange rates.
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case of our dataset, a lognormal transformation of WTP and income is not superior to other
functional forms, and hence the elasticity ofWTP for pollution control with respect to income
is not constant. Thus, it appears that our null hypothesis can be rejected.
To formally test this hypothesis, in Table 3 we present the results of the models in which
both Box-Cox transformation parameters were constrained to zero, resulting in the log–log
relationship betweenWTP for eutrophication reduction and income. The estimated (constant)
income elasticity is in the range of 0.23–0.29 (depending on the model specification), which
is in line with the evidence from studies which used a similar specification (e.g.,Kriström and
Riera 1996; Ready et al. 2002; Hökby and Söderqvist 2003; Jacobsen and Hanley 2009). We
note, however, that this specification is outperformed by a more flexible functional form, and
therefore, the restriction is unjustified. Since the two models are nested, we are able to test
this using the likelihood ratio test the results of which are presented in Table 4. The critical
value for the test statistic (Chi-squared with 2◦ of freedom) is 5.99 and therefore, we can
easily reject the restrictions, implying that the income elasticity of WTP is not constant for
our Baltic Sea dataset.
Finally, to provide an insight into the dynamics of the changes of the income elasticity
of WTP for eutrophication reduction, we calculate its values for different levels of income.
Following from our Box-Cox regression model specification (15), the elasticity is
ψ =
dWTP
WTP
dincome
income
= ∂ log (WTP)
∂ log (income)
= βincomeincome
λ1
λ0
(
xγ + βincome incomeλ1−1λ1
)
+ 1
. (16)
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 present the resulting elasticity estimates for different levels of income
observed in our data with the accompanying 95% confidence intervals5. We find that the
income elasticity is increasing and concave, and that it behaves similarly irrespectively of
model specification. It takes values of 0.1–0.2 for low-income respondents and reaches 0.6–
0.7 for the highest income levels observed in our dataset. This result is consistent with
previous findings in that the elasticity is less than one (Kriström and Riera 1996; Hökby
and Söderqvist 2003; Jacobsen and Hanley 2009; Lindhjem and Tuan 2012), and varies with
income (Ready et al. 2002; Czajkowski and Šcˇasný 2010).
Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that the income elasticity of
the WTP for environmental improvement is unlikely to be constant. We confirm that one
cannot infer the income elasticity for WTP for pollution reduction from the demand for
environmental quality with respect to income, and vice versa (Flores and Carson 1997; Ebert
2003). In addition, a constant elasticity is not necessary for an environmental Kuznets curve
relationship between pollution levels and income per capita (McConnell 1997; Israel and
Levinson 2004). In fact, we show that the elasticity of the marginal WTP of for pollution
reduction is only constant under very restrictive conditions.
Overall, these results should finally put to rest the “folklore myth” that an environmental
Kuznets curve for pollution control implies that the environment is a luxury good (Kriström
5 The confidence intervals were simulated numerically (Krinsky and Robb 1986). We used 106 draws from
multivariate normal distribution given by the vector of parameters and the associated variance–covariance
matrix of each model and for each set of parameters drawn in this way calculated the resulting elasticity (for
each income level). The lower and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval is approximated with the 0.025
and 0.975quantiles of the resulting empirical distribution.
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Table 4 Likelihood ratio test results of the non-linear versus constant income elasticity of WTP
Baseline model Model with
heteroskedascity
Model with
controls
Model with
controls and
heteroskedascity
LL −47,897.1751 −47,801.5856 −47,851.3664 −47,761.3722
LL (rescricted) −48,598.3857 −48,119.3229 −48,553.5376 −48,077.1279
LR test statistic 1402.4212 635.4745 1404.3424 631.5114
p value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Fig. 2 Income elasticity of WTP-baseline model
Fig. 3 Income elasticity of WTP-baseline model with heteroskedascity
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Fig. 4 Income elasticity of WTP-baseline model with controls
Fig. 5 Income elasticity of WTP-baseline model with controls and heteroskedascity
and Riera 1996), or that one can determine the magnitude of the income elasticity of the
WTP for environmental improvement from such an “EKC” relationship.
Our empirical investigation of the relationship betweenWTP for eutrophication reduction
and income was based on a large multi-country dataset for the Baltic Sea. This also leads
to rejection of the null hypothesis that the elasticity of the WTP for pollution control with
respect to income is constant. We find that this relationship is most likely to be concave,
taking values of 0.1–0.2 for low-income respondents and reaching values of 0.6–0.7 for the
highest income levels observed in our dataset.
The observation that the income elasticity of WTP is less than one is not new (Pearce
2006; Jacobsen and Hanley 2009). Although observed empirically from non-market valu-
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ation studies, this could be seen as difficult to reconcile with the evidence from national
environmental expenditures and how these respond to changes in GNP. The share of environ-
mental expenditure tends to rise with GNP (McFadden and Leonard 1993), and the elasticity
of this relationship is typically above one (e.g., estimated at 1.2 for the European Union coun-
tries; Pearce and Palmer 2001). In this light, our finding of a non-constant income elasticity
of WTP is reassuring—as noted by Haneman (1996), elasticities which are non-constant
over ranges of income make it possible to reconcile the observed income elasticities of WTP
below one with national expenditure elasticities greater than unity.
Our finding that the WTP for environmental improvement varies with respect to income
is directly relevant to the growing interest in transferring environmental values estimated
at one study site to other locations to aid environmental decision-making (Johnston and
Rosenberger 2010; Johnston et al. 2015). Recommended guidance principles for transferring
estimated WTP values for environmental improvement to other sites are often based on the
assumption that the income elasticity of these WTP values must be constant (Ready and
Navrud 2006; Czajkowski and Šcˇasný 2010; Lindhjem and Navrud 2015). In fact, such a
“quick and easy” approach to benefit transfer can lead to very good performance in terms
of lower transfer errors and minimum tolerance levels in comparison with even the very
elaborate specifications (Bateman et al. 2011; Ahtiainen et al. 2015). Nonetheless, if this
elasticity varies significantly with income levels, as our Baltic Sea case study application
suggests, then assuming a constant elasticity may lead to significant errors in the WTP
estimates based on such value transfers. Clearly, what is needed is robust estimation of a
range of income elasticities of WTP for environmental improvement, as we have developed
here. Also needed is a methodological framework which would allow one to incorporate
these observed nonlinearities in the income elasticity of WTP to models predicting how
WTP changes as respondents’ income levels change.
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